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I.  INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years the international humanitarian protec-
tion regime for displaced persons has been strengthened by, for ex-
ample, the emergence of protective guidelines for internally displaced
persons (IDPs).1 Ironically, during the same period, many states have
in theory and practice failed to respect the norms of various protec-
tive regimes.2  During times of interstate and intrastate armed conflict
or mass social unrest (e.g., gross violations of human
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1. See Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng,
Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39: Guiding Principles on Internal Dis-
placement. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 9(d), at 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement].
2. These include international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law norms, and
the emerging protective regime for IDPs.
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rights),3combatants and other perpetrators have generally ignored
universal refugee, human rights, and humanitarian protective norms.
This has not only exacerbated Africa’s refugee and IDP dilemma, but
also resulted in an incalculable number of war crimes and crimes
against humanity being committed against civilians, humanitarian
workers, peacekeepers and combatants.  As a result, African people,
and more specifically women and children, have suffered the greatest
indignity,4 and to make matters worse, the international community
has yet to forward a viable solution to the problem.
In the absence of the international politics of the Cold War, Af-
rica’s geo-political stock has greatly devalued, and its former stock-
brokers have not been genuinely interested in finding new ways to
proactively re-engage and reinvest.  They have simply ignored the
need to re-conceptualize the nature of their relationships with Afri-
can states, which has mistakenly caused many Western policy-makers
to be convinced that they have no strategic interests in Africa.  Others
like the United States purport to have an African policy.  During the
Clinton Administration one commentator noted that “[s]tripped of its
Clintonian rhetorical veneer,” U.S. policy toward Africa is “extractive
commercial, limited security and selective humanitarianism—remain
the cardinal ordinances of US foreign policy towards the continent.”5
It is yet to be seen whether the Bush Administration will adopt a
more progressive policy toward Africa.  Although U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell claims to have a keen interest in African issues, his
designee for Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs will serve
as the first indicator of his genuineness.  Such policy is in theory and
practice cosmetic and instituted to pacify domestic constituencies.
This may explain why, similar to the United States, many countries
refuse to provide genuine human resources (e.g., peace-keepers and
peace-enforcers) to avert conflict and alleviate human suffering in
Africa when there is no overriding domestic strategic interest.  The
cases of Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sierra Leone clearly
show that the risks involved with saving African lives in Africa far
3. This article will primarily focus on internal armed conflict.  The terms internal armed
conflict, internal conflict, and war are used interchangeably.
4. See Duane Bratt, Peace over Justice: Developing a Framework for UN Peacekeeping
Operations in Internal Conflicts, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 63 (1999); see generally J. Oloka-
Onyango, The Plight of the Larger Half: Human Rights, Gender Violence and the Legal Status of
the Refugee and Internally Displaced Women in Africa, 24 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 349
(1996).
5. Chris Alden, From Neglect to ‘Virtual Engagement’: The United States and its New
Paradigm for Africa, 99 AFR. AFF. 355, 368 (2000).
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outweigh the benefits.  Furthermore, the case of Kosovo unmistaka-
bly demonstrates that, unless people of European descent are threat-
ened with death or suffering on a grand scale the “more civilized” na-
tions of the North, and the international organizations which they
control, are reluctant to expend human and tangible resources to save
lives.  This is especially true with respect to the “Dark Continent,”
where the international community spent $0.11 a day per refugee in
Rwanda and Sierra Leone, compared to an approximate $1.50 a day
per refugee in Kosovo.6 Such disparities lead one to conclude that
race and geo-politics are as much determining factors as national stra-
tegic interests when it comes to international peace and security, es-
pecially as it relates to Africa.
Notwithstanding, perhaps, European and American forces
should not be employed for peace-keeping in Africa, but rather pro-
vide tangible resources such as logistics, reconnaissance, and commu-
nications support to African peace-enforcers, as the records of the
former in Africa are at best dismal.  On this point, one analyst com-
ments,
It seems that every peacekeeping operation has had its share of
horror stories: US soldiers offending Muslim values by skinny-
dipping in Somalia; Canadians torturing and murdering Somali ci-
vilians; Dutch peacekeepers ‘luring Bosnian children into a field to
check for land mines by throwing sweets into the area’; and
UNTAC’s Bulgarian contingent becoming involved in prostitution
and smuggling. Although professional conduct should be a funda-
mental part of all peacekeeping operations, its importance is
greater in internal conflicts because of the greater level of civilian
interaction. In cases of delivering humanitarian assistance or con-
ducting elections, the peacekeeping force must establish a high
level of trust with the target country’s civilians, and this trust can be
destroyed for the entire force because of deplorable acts by a few
peacekeepers.7
Given the enormous problems that European and American
U.N. peacekeepers have had in Africa, and considering the demon-
strably high degree of reluctance of western governments to take part
in future peace-keeping activities on the continent, African govern-
ments must take the leadership role in dealing with the brutal realities
6. See Karen DeYoung, Generosity Shrinks in an Age of Prosperity, WASH. POST, Nov.
25, 1999, at A01.
7. Bratt, supra note 4, at 72 (quoting Dutch Inquiry into PK Misconduct, INT’L
PEACEKEEPING NEWS (May 1995) <http://csf.colorado.edu/dfax/ipn/ipn09.htm#T0091>.
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of African conflict.8  As the peace negotiations in Burundi illustrate,
when western nations disagree with African regional actors,9 “they
are often unwilling to defer to the African consensus.”10  Therefore,
perhaps more so than at any other time in the past, African govern-
ments need to be committed to establishing and enhancing local, sub-
regional, and regional mechanisms to prevent, manage, and resolve
conflict in Africa.
The present Article seeks to examine the preparedness of certain
African regional actors to protect displaced persons in times of armed
conflict, and to prescribe formulas to strengthen the capabilities of
such actors. The objective is to assess the conflict maintenance capaci-
ties of African regional actors and their partners to provide physical
and legal protection to displaced persons in times of armed conflict,
and likewise to recommend strategies to increase protection.11  I argue
that African regional actors have a significant role to play in protect-
ing the rights of displaced persons, but in order to effectively prevent,
manage, and resolve conflict they must develop and institute new, and
strengthen and adhere to pre-existing protective mechanisms and le-
gal instruments.  Such analyses are important due to the growing
numbers of refugees and other persons of concern,12 which according
to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees stands at
approximately 6.3 million in Africa out of a global figure of 21.5 mil-
8. See Recommendations of the Brookings Institution/UNHCR/OAU Workshop on Inter-
nal Displacement in Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Oct. 19-20, 1998; see generally UNHCR,
THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA (1997)
<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/state/97/toc.htm>.
9. A regional actor may be defined as any regional organization, agency, entity, or ar-
rangement made up of and empowered by states to represent their interests, whether economic,
political, military, social, cultural, or religious.
10. Stephen R. Weissman, Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International
Diplomacy, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, 1998, No. 22 at 19.
11. Protection may broadly be defined as a concept which “encompasses all activities
aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and
the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e., human rights law, international humanitarian law
and refugee law).” International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Background Paper for
the 3rd Workshop on Protection, held in Geneva, Jan. 18-20, 1999.  This includes physical and
legal protection, as well as the specific rights and obligations provided for in general human
rights and humanitarian law and the OAU Refugee Convention for the benefit of refugees and
other persons of concern.
12. The term “other persons of concern” is a notion frequently used by UNHCR to refer to
specific groups of persons not falling within the ordinary mandate of UNHCR including asylum-
seekers, returnees, IDPs, and stateless persons.  For further information see UNHCR, 1998
GLOBAL REPORT: ACHIEVEMENTS AND IMPACT (1998) <http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/gr98/toc.
htm>, and UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA
(1997) <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/state/97/toc.htm>.
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lion.13  As Cohen and Deng observe, the plight of African refugees
and IDPs “not only poses a humanitarian challenge but also threatens
the security and stability of countries, regions, and through a chain ef-
fect, the international system of which they are an integral part.”14
In this context, the Article first analyzes the key components of
an effective conflict maintenance system; secondly, critically assesses
the conflict prevention, management, and resolution capacities of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on De-
velopment (IGAD); finally, it offers comprehensive suggestions and
solutions to moniter and avert population displacement and protect
displaced persons.  The fields of inquiry are conflict and security
studies, public international law, political science, and international
relations. The scope of the study is limited to an appraisal of the pro-
tection policies and capacities of such regional actors in internal con-
flicts,15 the general character of their relations with the United Na-
tions (U.N.), and more specifically their association with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the U.N. Development
Program (UNDP), and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR).
Considering the vast amount of literature on the subject, the nu-
merous issues, and the various perspectives that this topic engenders,
the foregoing description is modest given the enormity of the prob-
lem, and the method, though capacious, is sagacious.  The general na-
ture of the Article is prescriptive rather than investigative, as it is gen-
erally recognized by academics and practitioners alike that the root
causes of population displacement in Africa are related to internal
conflict.  As the former Director of the OAU Bureau for Refugees,
Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs observed, the situation
of refugees and displaced persons may be attributed to armed con-
flicts, civil strife, political and ethnic intolerance, human rights abuses,
natural disasters, or calamities and poverty.16  Hence, an elucidation
13. This figure is as of January 1, 1999.  For further information see UNHCR website
<http://www.unhcr.ch>, or REFWORLD CD-ROM, UNHCR, Geneva, July 1999 edition.
14. Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, Introduction, in THE FORSAKEN PEOPLE: CASE
STUDIES OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED 1 (Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng eds., 1998).
15. Due to space limitations the scope of the Article has been limited; however, it should
be noted that the basic argument of the Article is equally applicable to regionalized internal
conflict (e.g., the DRC and Angola) and interstate conflict (e.g., Ethiopian/Eritrea).
16. See E.M. Ngung, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in Situations of
Conflict and Displacement, 18 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 97 (1999).
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of the causes of such conflict in the context of forcibly displaced per-
sons would only detract from an analysis of the protection capacities
and strategies of African regional actors to prevent displacement and
protect refugees and IDPs.
The term displaced persons is used to make reference to refu-
gees, internally displaced persons and other persons of concern17 who
have been displaced due to internal deadly conflict, gross violations of
human rights, militarism, socio-economic inequalities, and lack of
good governance and democratic institutions.18 Special attention will
not be given to any category of displacement as the analysis is pri-
marily concerned with examining the institutional capacities of Afri-
can regional actors to protect displaced persons in times of war.19  The
focal point of discussion, however, will center on internal deadly con-
flict, since it has been responsible for producing the greatest number
of conflict-related fatalities and forcibly displaced persons over the
past several years.20
The underlying concept of regional collective protection con-
notes the inability of a state to protect its citizenry.  Hence, inquiries
into the causes of deadly conflict and their progeny, coerced popula-
17. For the purposes of this Article the term “refugee” shall be defined as “every person
who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10,
1969, art.1(1), 8 I.L.M. 1288.  The term “internally displaced person” shall be defined as “per-
sons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”  Report of the
Representative of the Secretary-General, supra note 1, at Annex.
18. It is important to note that Ms. Ogata, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, indi-
cated at the Formal Session of the Security Council that no organization is responsible for the
security of people who have fled their homes but not crossed a border. See Anonymous, Africa’s
Moment Under the UN’s Gaze, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2000, at 41.  However, “notwithstand-
ing the fact that UNHCR does not have a general competence to deal with internally displaced
persons, it may, under certain conditions, become involved in activities on behalf of particular
groups.” Note on International Protection, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s
Programme, 50th Sess., at para. 44, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/914 (1999).
19. The terms forcibly displaced persons, displaced persons, and displaced are used inter-
changeably.
20. See generally Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, PREVENTING
DEADLY CONFLICT: FINAL REPORT WITH EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Carnegie Corp. of New
York 1997).
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tion movements, are generally state-centered,21 meaning that the
problem of refugees and IDPs in Africa is often viewed by academics
and policy-makers alike as one that only concerns states that are di-
rectly affected by displaced persons, as opposed to sub-regional, re-
gional, and international state actors.  As a result, state-centric ap-
proaches do not provide adequate insight into how third party
intermediaries (e.g., the United Nations or OAU) may provide pro-
tection to displaced persons during times of armed conflict.  This is
particularly true when the primary culprit is the government of a state
(e.g., Iraq), or when a government has collapsed due to armed con-
flict and is unable to maintain itself in power or protect its citizens
(e.g., Liberia and Sierra Leone), or likewise, when a government does
not exist (e.g., Somalia).  In these scenarios, state-centric analyses be-
come moot because the state can no longer be viewed as the referent
object of protection.  State-centered approaches fall under the rubric
of conflict prevention as they seek to address conflict at its root, by
averting conflict altogether through, for example, structural or institu-
tional reform.  The concepts of conflict management and resolution,
however, are broadly concerned with stopping conflict once it has be-
gun and, in this context, preventing mass population movements.
Hence, the challenge is to determine how external third party actors,
specifically African regional actors, can provide physical and legal
protections, food, shelter, and rapid medical attention to displaced
persons in crisis situations.
The following section will discuss the concepts of conflict preven-
tion, management, and resolution as separate but interdependent
components and processes of a comprehensive conflict maintenance
system, which African states and regional actors must institute in or-
der to provide ample protection to displaced persons.
II.  CONFLICT MAINTENANCE AS A PREVENTIVE AND
PROTECTIVE STRATEGY
The most effective and sustainable way to prevent coerced
population movements and protect displaced persons is to establish
comprehensive conflict maintenance systems at the local, national,
regional, and international levels.  A comprehensive conflict mainte-
nance system is one that has three functional objectives: conflict pre-
21. The terms state-centered and state-centric will be used interchangeably. They refer to
overly structural and or institutional approaches to conflict management that do not give due
attention to contingent factors, i.e., individual political actors.
LEVITT.DOC 04/04/01  3:10 PM
46 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 11:39
vention, management, and resolution (see Table 1 below).  Again, the
aims are neither static nor separate but rather are interdependent
processes, which form a unique and sometimes intelligible continuum.
Although there are wide spectrums of opinion regarding the precise
meanings of the concepts of conflict prevention, management, and
resolution, it is more useful to define them in political and operational
terms.
The political aim of conflict prevention should be to avert con-
flict altogether, or at the least to defuse it in its initial stages, with
trust-building, coalition building, and negotiated settlements being
key objectives.22 From an operational standpoint this may be done in
a variety of ways, most notably through traditional and untraditional
preventive diplomacy or preventive deployment.23 The displacement
objective should be to ensure that adequate state protection exists for
populations affected by conflict.  No conflict prevention mechanism
can be sustained, however, in the absence of viable early warning and
risk assessment systems.24 Information attainment and analysis are
perhaps the most important functions of any conflict maintenance
system and are crucial for crisis prevention, as they provide decision-
makers with crucial information to enable them to take decisive ac-
tions before conflict escalates resulting in coerced population move-
ments.
Conflict management is the most important conflict maintenance
process because it is the one most integral to the physical and legal
protection of displaced people, and in this context works to prevent
the escalation of refugee flows and IDPs.  The political objective of
conflict management is to promote trust and confidence, and with re-
spect to displaced persons, ensure peace, security, and stability to al-
low for voluntary repatriation and internal replacement.25 The dis-
placement aim should be to minimize the escalation of conflict and
provide humanitarian assistance and other case specific solutions.
The operational objective should be to establish order through in-
22. For more on this issue, see generally Jeremy Levitt, Pre-Intervention Trust-Building,
African States and Enforcing the Peace: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 24
LIBERIAN STUD. J., 1 (1999).
23. Preventive diplomacy may be defined as communicative action aimed at forestalling
conflict. Preventive deployment consists of dispatching non-armed and impartial support per-
sonnel into a zone of crisis in order to enhance the vitality of diplomatic processes.
24. For more on this issue, see generally PREVENTIVE MEASURES: BUILDING RISK
ASSESSMENT AND CRISIS EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS (John L. Davies & Ted Robert Gurr eds.,
1998).
25. Internal replacement refers to the return of IDPs to their places of habitual residence.
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tense preventive diplomacy, coercive sanctions, peacekeeping, and
peace-enforcement or humanitarian intervention.  This requires po-
litical will and resources because in situations of armed conflict the
human and tangible risks may be costly.
Conflict resolution is the last conflict maintenance process and
represents the linchpin to sustainable peace.  The political objective
of conflict resolution should be to maintain and sustain peace by
building and re-building civil society and state institutions to allow for
transparency and accountability.  The displacement aim should be to
negotiate agreements on the return of displaced persons to their
home states and/or places of habitual residence.  Therefore, the op-
erational objectives likewise should be first to monitor impartially
cease-fire agreements and other accords, and also to preserve peace
and security to allow for repatriation, demobilization, and the devel-
opment of civil society and government structures, including political
and judicial processes to bring about justice and reconciliation.
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Table 1
Phases of Conflict Reduction and Protective Strategies
Stages Conflict
Maintenance
Processes
Political
Objectives
Political
Functions
Operational
Objectives
Operational
Functions
Displacement
Objectives
1  Conflict
Prevention
Conflict
Aversion
Preventive
Diplomacy &
Deployment
Promoting Trust Cease-fire or
Negotiated
Settlement
Ensuring State
Protection to
Affected Civilian
Populations
2  Conflict
Management
Security and
Stability
Valid Mandate:
Peace-Keeping
Peace-
Enforcement
Establishing
Order
Protection of
Displaced and
Warfare
Containment
Minimizing the
Escalation of
Conflict:
Humanitarian
Assistance &
Durable Solutions
3  Conflict
Resolution
Sustainable
Peace
Re-integration
Post Conflict
Peace-building
Maintaining
Order
Monitor  Cease-
Fire & Accords
Civil Society
Capacity-building
Demobilization
Negotiate
Agreements on the
Return of Displaced
Persons
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While the primary purpose for establishing a conflict mainte-
nance system is to avert conflict, the underlying aim of conflict aver-
sion is to safeguard the rights of people by minimizing the effects of
conflict upon them.  Hence, any viable conflict maintenance system
must be principally concerned with protecting war-affected popula-
tions.  The effectiveness of such systems will ultimately be judged ac-
cording to their ability to safeguard internationally recognized rights.
The three internationally recognized regimes for the protection of
displaced persons are the following: human rights law, specifically the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,26 the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,27 the 1966 International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,28 and in Africa, the
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights;29 humanitarian
law, which comprises the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
two Additional Protocols of 1977;30 refugee law, as enumerated in the
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol,31 the 1954 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of State-
less Persons,32 the 1961 U.N. Convention on the Reduction of State-
lessness,33 and in Africa, the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.34  Additionally, there
is an emerging protection regime on IDPs, particularly the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, facilitated by the Representative
of the U.N. Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons.35
These instruments provide for basic protection including, but not
limited to, physical protection, food, shelter, clothing, and the integ-
rity of the person and the family as the most fundamental social unit.36
26. See G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
27. See Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
28. See Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
29. See June 27, 1981, 21 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 58.
30. See Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Aug 12, 1949 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.  [2 Protocols] June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
31. See July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; [protocol] Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
32. See Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 130.
33. See Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
34. See Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
35. See Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 1.
36. See Francis M. Deng, The International Protection of the Internally Displaced, INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 74, 81 (Special Issue 1995).
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As one analyst notes, states unquestionably “constitute the pri-
mary nexus when it comes to security for individuals and groups.”37
When states fail or are unable to prevent, manage, or resolve internal
conflict and fulfill their principal function of providing protection to
civilians from rebels and insurgents (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Angola), they may be responsible for committing illegal acts.  Beyani
highlights four principles, which are of particular relevance in this re-
gard: 38
(a) A State is only liable for the wrongful acts of rebels if it was at
fault in failing to prevent or suppress the rebellion as such.  The
liability of the State is qualified because rebels hold no official
position in the State and they are beyond the control of the
State.39
(b) Although no arbitral tribunal has ever found a State guilty of
negligence to prevent a rebellion, there is clear inference in the
decisions of certain tribunals that the defendant State would
only have been liable if it had failed to take steps to prevent a
rebellion that was reasonably foreseeable.40
(c) A State is under a duty to act with diligence or to take reason-
able steps to suppress a rebellion. The method of doing so falls
within the discretion of the State and may involve the propor-
tionate use of force or a negotiated settlement with the rebels.
(d) A successful rebel movement is responsible for illegal acts
committed by its forces during the conflict and assumes respon-
sibility for the wrongful acts of the State.41
The above principles only concern states’ liability for failure to fore-
stall the wrongful acts of insurgents; however, they are especially
relevant to the legal obligations of governments to safeguard the well-
being and rights of displaced persons during armed conflict.42  The in-
ternational protective regime would also appear to require that states
provide protections to the citizens of foreign countries engulfed in
war or impacted by some other malady.43  For example, the OAU
Refugee Convention of 1969 contains three key principles concerning
37. G. Sorensen, Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal
Problem, SECURITY DIALOGUE, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1996).
38. Chaloka Beyani, State Responsibility for the Prevention and Resolution of Forced
Population Displacements, INT’L. J. REFUGEE L. 130, 140 (Special Issue 1995).
39. See Sambaggio Case (Italy v. Venez.) 10 R.I.A.A. 499 (Mixed Cl. Comm’n. Italy-
Venez. 1903).
40. See Ziat and Ben Kiran claim (Gr. Brit. v. Spain) 2 R.I.A.A. 729, 730; Home Mission-
ary Society Claim (U.S. v. U.K.) 1920, R.I.A.A. iv, 42, 44.
41. See Short v. Iran (U.S. v. Iran ) 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 76 (1987).
42. See Beyani, supra note 38, at 138.
43. See id.
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refugees: the individual’s right to seek asylum; the right of non-
refoulement; and the concept of voluntary repatriation.44  Article 1(2)
of the Convention “widens the term refugee and includes people who
are displaced as a result of warfare or other civil disorder; as well as
due to the conditions of famine and natural catastrophes.”45  Regard-
less of whether coerced population movements are a manifestation of
the acts of rebels, repressive regimes, or alternative forms of civil
strife, under international law, states have a de jure obligation to act
reasonably to protect the rights of their citizens and in certain in-
stances those of other states.  When states fail to act responsibly or are
inhibited from taking appropriate action, under international law, the
international community as a whole is obliged to take corrective ac-
tion.46  This contention is also supported by Principle 5 of the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, which states that “all authorities
and international actors shall respect and ensure respect for their ob-
ligations under international law, including human rights and humani-
tarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions
that might lead to the displacement of persons.”47
Customary international law comprises standards that are bind-
ing upon all states, most notably the right to life, self-determination,
the prohibitions against slavery, genocide, torture, cruel, inhumane,
and degrading treatment, and racial and systematic patterns of dis-
crimination.48  Customary international law also embodies stronger
protective norms referred to as jus cogens, which are peremptory
norms accepted and recognized by the international community as
norms from which no derogation is permitted and that can be modi-
fied only by a subsequent norm of general character.  These norms sit
atop the hierarchy of international law, pre-empting both conflicting
treaties and customary international law,49 and constituting erga om-
nes obligations—universal obligations and responsibilities upon states
44. See OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
supra note 17, at art. 2, 5.
45. Ram. C. Chhangani, African Refugee Law: Problems and Prospects, 53 INAUGURAL
LECTURE SERIES 9 (1992).
46. See Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3 para 33-34 (Second
Phase).
47. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 1, Section 2, Principle 5.  See
also Roberta Cohen, International Standards to Protect Internally Displaced Persons, REFUGEE
SURV. Q., Vol. 18, No. 1, 38-43 (1999).
48. See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 64, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
49. See W.D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 32
NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV., 357, 418 (1985).
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to ensure that such norms are not violated.50  If or when they are vio-
lated, states may employ lawful means to remedy the situation, which
may for example include preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, and
humanitarian intervention.51  Today, states may no longer hide behind
the cloaks of state sovereignty, noninterference, and territorial integ-
rity.  The law de lege lata appears to permit humanitarian intervention
to protect displaced persons in three instances: when there are human
rights abuses in a state that are so egregious as to violate the jus co-
gens norms of international law; when a state has collapsed and is
withering into a state of anarchy; and when intervention is necessary
to safeguard democracy when a democratic government has been
violently and illegally dislodged against the will of its domestic popu-
lation.52  Although the above criteria concern the customary interna-
tional law doctrine of humanitarian intervention and hence unilateral-
collective action by states (i.e., collective action without U.N. Security
Council authorization), the United Nations may likewise invoke a
right to humanitarian intervention by taking action under Chapter 7
of the U.N. Charter.  When states cannot or will not protect displaced
persons (e.g., Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Angola, Mozam-
bique, and Sierra Leone), the responsibility to do so falls on the
whole of the international community.  The responsibility exists, even
if it requires interfering in the internal affairs of states and breaching
classical notions of state sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial
integrity.  In Africa, there are several examples of humanitarian in-
tervention by regional actors (e.g., ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Le-
one, and Guinea-Bissau, MISAB in the Central African Republic
(CAR), and SADC in Lesotho) and the United Nations (e.g., Liberia,
Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and CAR).  With exception to the
SADC intervention in Lesotho, all of these interventions were sup-
ported by the whole of the international community.
The international community, the United Nations in particular,
has a gloomy record of safeguarding the rights of forcibly displaced
50. See Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), supra note 46.
51. Humanitarian intervention can be taken to mean intervention in a state involving the
threat of force (U.N. action in Haiti) or use of force (U.N. action in Iraq and Somalia or
ECOWAS action in Liberia and Sierra Leone), where the intervenor deploys armed forces and,
at the least, makes clear that it is willing to use force if its operation is resisted as it attempts to
alleviate conditions in which a substantial part of the population of a state is threatened with
death or suffering on a grand scale.  See Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional
Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT’L
& COMP. L.J. 333 (1998).
52. See Levitt, supra note 51, at 336-37.
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persons in Africa.  Conversely, African states have a far better record
in this regard; for example, refugees from Liberia, Angola, and Mo-
zambique have all enjoyed relative safety and security in Guinea,
Côte d’Ivoire, Zambia, and Malawi, respectively.  On this point, Mi-
chael Platzer aptly comments that “Africa, in fact, hosts more refu-
gees and internally displaced persons than any other continent in the
world.”53  The OAU Convention and the Cartenga Declaration may
in part explain the greater generosity of African and Latin American
governments in accepting victims of war and persecution.54  African
states have also demonstrated a keen willingness to take a leadership
role in the prevention, management, and resolution of African con-
flict.  Hence, when states (i.e., the international community) fail to
fulfill their erga omes obligations by safe-guarding the rights of dis-
placed persons in Africa, questions concerning states’ responsibility
to take preventive and protective action become moot.  Perhaps the
more appropriate question should be who is interested in and best
suited in this regard?  The cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Central Af-
rican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Lesotho arguably show that Afri-
cans are the most committed and best suited to safeguard the rights of
Africans.55  The latter cases also illustrate, however, that Africans lack
the resources and logistical capacities to provide adequate protection.
The following three sections will examine the capability of Afri-
can regional actors to provide physical and legal protection to dis-
placed people, and discuss how those organizations and the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, notably UNHCR, UNHCHR,
and UNDP, and other international organizations can work together
to enhance their protective mandates.
53. Michael Platzer, Temporary Protection of a Persecuted People, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 282 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
54. See id.
55. This view is supported by several delegations at the Regional Meeting on Refugees Is-
sues in the Great Lakes, held in Kampala, Uganda, May 8-9, 1998, who observed that regional
multinational forces might prove more effective than international forces as a means of main-
taining peace and security in areas of conflict. See Recommendations of the OAU/UNHCR Re-
gional Meeting on Refugee Issues in the Great Lakes, Adopted at the OAU/UNHCR Regional
Meeting on Refugee Issues in the Great Lakes, Kampala, Uganda, May 8-9, 1998.
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III.  THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)
A. Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention should be the first phase of any comprehen-
sive conflict maintenance system.56  Crisis early warning and risk as-
sessment are the most essential components of any viable conflict
preventive scheme, and preventive diplomacy and deployment are
the most important functional features of conflict prevention.  Most
African states and regional actors do not have conflict early warning
and risk assessment capabilities.  Nonetheless, this has not deterred
them from engaging in preventive diplomacy, deployment, and peace-
keeping.  Today, African regional actors like the OAU are attempting
to develop systematic conflict prevention capacities. In the past, the
majority of their time was spent “dealing with the effects of conflict,
rather than preventing situations of tension from growing into full
blown conflict.”57
African leaders have had to rely on preventive diplomacy and
peace-enforcement as the primary means of conflict mitigation, the
former being most applicable prior to armed conflict and the latter
when it has reached an intolerable state.  Yet, it is the period between
these two stages when displaced persons are most vulnerable.  Thus,
rapid preventive deployment (with an operational capacity to up-
grade to peace-keeping) may serve as a deterrent to and buffer be-
tween low intensity conflict and full blown warfare, which is the pri-
mary cause of displacement.  In light of this, conflict prevention must
not be seen as an independent process, but rather as one which is in-
extricably linked to conflict management and resolution.  On this is-
sue, one analyst notes that the “distinction between conflict resolu-
tion/management and conflict prevention is not clear-cut, but that
these involve instruments that are part of a continuum of activities
which are undertaken at different points of the life cycle of a con-
flict.”58
56. See generally BREAKING CYCLES OF VIOLENCE: CONFLICT PREVENTION IN
INTRASTATE CRISIS (Janie Leatherman et al. eds., 1999).
57. Christopher J. Bakwesegha, The Role of the Organisation of African Unity in Conflict
Prevention, INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 207, 216 (Special Issue 1995).
58. Klaas van Walraven, Inter-governmental Organisation and Preventing Conflicts: Politi-
cal Practice Since the End of the Cold War, in EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION
19, 21 (Klaas van Walraven ed., 1998).
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Arguably, the OAU has been the most active African regional
actor in the area of conflict prevention.59  It has been more operative
in African preventive diplomacy than the ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD,
United Nations, and donor nations.  For example, OAU’s diplomatic
efforts in the Congo (Brazzaville) “helped mediate a peace treaty be-
tween the opposing sides in a conflict resulting from disputed general
elections.”60  Moreover, its labors in Rwanda enlisted support from
the former President of Tanzania and eminent African statesman,
Julius Nyerere, which eventually led to the Arusha Accord in 1993.61
Notwithstanding, there is no international consensus as to its effec-
tiveness in this area.
Since the end of the Cold War the OAU has arguably employed
the art with mixed outcomes in Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Congo
(Brazzaville), Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Western
Sahara.  In 1993, it established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution (MCPMR) to employ a systems ap-
proach to conflict maintenance.62  The primary objective of the
Mechanism is to anticipate and prevent conflicts.63  The MCPMR is
built around a Central Organ with the Secretary-General and Secre-
tariat as its operational arm, and is composed of the states’ members
of the Bureau of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Govern-
ment as well as Ministers and Ambassadors accredited to the OAU,
who are elected annually.64  The Mechanism has been preoccupied
with conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy as opposed to
conflict management and resolution, because averting conflict is far
less expensive than attempting to forestall it.
According to OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, in
times of armed conflict the primary aim of the Mechanism is to “un-
dertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facili-
tate conflict resolution, and it could mount and deploy civilian and
military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and
59. See, e.g., Ogenga Otunnu, Conflict and Conflict Resolution, REFUGE, Dec. 1997, at 1.
60. Report of the Cairo Consultation, The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Man-
agement and Resolution, Cairo, Egypt, May 7-11, 1994, p. 18 [hereinafter Report of the Cairo
Consultation].
61. See id.
62. See Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establish-
ment, Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,
Cairo, Egypt, June 1993, Provision 15 [hereinafter Declaration of the Assembly].
63. See id.
64. See Declaration of the Assembly, supra note 62, Provisions 17-18.
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duration.”65  As previously alluded to, however, the OAU is hindered
by its lack of an operable intelligence gathering and evaluation ca-
pacity, and thus “the OAU will need an effective early-warning sys-
tem to support the MCPMR.”66  Without such a capacity the MCPMR
lacks empirical legitimacy and functional operability, both of which
are needed to enable OAU decision-makers to make sound decisions
and take decisive action.
Although the OAU intends to develop early warning and risk as-
sessment capacities,67 its inability to adequately predict and respond
to conflict has, in contravention of the spirit of the OAU Refugee
Convention of 1969, inhibited its ability to provide protection to dis-
placed persons and prevent population displacement.  The main pur-
pose of the OAU Convention is to establish a firm legal standard for
refugees and ensure their safety and security, thus decreasing the
likelihood of mass population displacement.68  However, this principal
function cannot be fulfilled unless host states and humanitarian actors
are supplied with sound information about the location, direction,
number, and immediate needs of refugees and internally displaced
persons.  The failure of the OAU to develop such capabilities has
greatly hindered its ability to assist displaced people and others af-
fected by armed conflict.
Similarly, preventive deployment of civilian and military missions
of observation and monitoring requires reliable intelligence, recon-
naissance, and logistics capacities.  Preventive deployment is not
peace-keeping, but rather an extension of preventive diplomacy,
which typically follows low intensity conflict but precedes high inten-
sity warfare.  Intelligence gathering, logistical planning, and conflict
deterrence are major aims of preventive deployment.  Although the
OAU lacks such abilities, its relatively successful observation mission
in Burundi in December of 1993,69 illustrates its willingness and ability
to launch preventive deployment missions.  Hence, when the OAU
develops early warning, risk assessment, and logistical capabilities, it
will be in a stronger position to protect displaced persons and will at-
tain greater legitimacy and trust from its Member States, bilateral do-
65. Salim Ahmed Salim, The Role of Regional Organisations in Preventive Action, in
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 100, 104  (Kevin M. Cahill ed., 1996).
66. Salim, supra note 65, at 117.
67. See OAU EARLY WARNING SYSTEM ON CONFLICT SITUATION IN AFRICA (Samuel
Bassey Ibok & William G. Nhara eds., 1996).
68. See OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Sept. 10, 1969; 1000 U.N.T.S. 46 (entered into force June 20, 1974).
69. See Report of the Cairo Consultation, supra note 60, at 19.
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nors, and other regional actors concerning its standing as an authentic
peace broker.
B. Conflict Management
It has historically been the practice of the Member States of the
OAU to strictly adhere to the international law principles of state
sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal af-
fairs of states, and inviolability of inherited borders.  The consent and
cooperation of parties to a conflict has been a prerequisite to peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement.70  As a result, the OAU has re-
frained from employing coercive methods to forestall internal con-
flict.  This practice has had serious ramifications for the protection of
IDPs in particular, where the “primary duty and responsibility for
providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs lies with national authori-
ties.”71  However, the complex nature of internal conflict has meant
that domestic authorities have not always been the ideal patrons of
IDPs.72  Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the OAU, with exception
to intensified preventive diplomacy, has been its incapacity to deal
with the effects of conflict—i.e., manage conflict—as evidenced by its
1981 mission in Chad.73  Nevertheless, the institution of the OAU
MCPMR appears to be the first step toward developing such a capac-
ity.
Provision 9 of the Declaration establishing the MCPMR states
that “[c]onflicts have forced millions of our people into a drifting life
as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means
of livelihood, human dignity and hope.”74  Consequently, forcibly dis-
placed persons were clearly a key consideration in the establishment
of the MCPMR.  Moreover, Provision 15 of the Declaration states
that in times of armed conflict the Mechanism will be responsible for
undertaking “peace-making and peace-building functions” in order to
facilitate the resolution of conflict.75  Since the MCPMR does not de-
fine the terms “peace-making and peace-building,” Provision 15 of
70. See GINO J. NALDI, THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS
ROLE 18 (2nd ed. 1999).
71. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 1, principle 25 § 1(iv).
72. See presentation by Chief Segun Olusola, Application of the Guiding Principles in Af-
rica: the Issue of Sovereignty, REFUGEE SURV. Q., Vol. 18, No.1 (1999).
73. C.O.C. AMATE, INSIDE THE OAU: PAN-AFRICANISM IN PRACTICE 181-189 (1986).
74. Declaration of the Assembly, supra note 62, at provision 9.
75. Id. provision 15.
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the Declaration gives some guidance as to their scope within the field
of conflict prevention, management, and resolution:
In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and
monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and de-
ployed. In setting these objectives, we are fully convinced that
prompt and decisive action in these spheres will, in the first in-
stance, prevent the emergence of conflicts, and where they do inevi-
tably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or general-
ised conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures,
and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obvi-
ate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding
peace-keeping operations. . . .76
Under Provision 15 it thus appears that peace-making and peace-
building fall somewhere between conflict prevention and conflict
management.  Although there is no concurrence among scholars and
practitioners as to the exact meanings of the terms peace-making,
peace-building, and peace-keeping, the above passage suggests that
the OAU established the MCPMR to engage in conflict prevention
and resolution rather than management.  Nonetheless the OAU em-
powered the MCPMR to “prevent or manage and ultimately resolve
conflicts when and where they occur,”77 or stated differently, “stop
[conflict from] degenerating into intense or generalised conflicts,”78
which would inevitably require action that falls within the rubric of
conflict management (see Table 1 above).  The OAU, however, has
yet to specify what type of action this may entail.  Furthermore, taken
together, Provisions 15 and 16 of the Declaration indicate that peace-
keeping is an unpopular conflict maintenance option, which if pur-
sued, should only be conducted under the auspices of the United Na-
tions.79  Hence a dichotomy exists in the sense that the OAU sanc-
tioned the MCPMR to stop conflict and protect displaced persons on
the one hand, but has discouraged it from doing so on the other.
Moreover, the MCPMR does not have the requisite human and tan-
gible resources to prevent coerced population movements or to pro-
tect displaced persons.  Therefore, with exception to intensified pre-
ventive diplomacy, the OAU clearly has no viable conflict
management capability.  Nonetheless, it is taking measures to
strengthen its capacity to act and build upon the example contained in
the newly established ECOWAS Mechanism according to which the
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. provision 12.
78. Id. provision 15.
79. See id. provisions 15, 16.
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OAU Secretary-General encourages member states to “act effectively
to prevent, manage or settle deadly conflicts in Africa when deemed
necessary.”80
In order for the OAU to effectively manage conflict and ensure
that its member states understand and fulfill their legal obligations
under the OAU Refugee Convention, it will need to reconsider its
political position vis-à-vis the new international system of peace and
security.  Its classical and conservative adherence to the international
principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-
interference, must be revisited.  This means that “nothing short of an
overhaul of the Charter of the OAU will cure the anomalies afflicting
the organization,”81 which will require progressive political leadership
and visionassets that it does not have in abundance.
It will also need to develop an enforcement regime and capacity
or likewise enter into partnerships with states or regional actors that
can carry out peace-keeping and peace-enforcement functions on its
behalf.  Unless the OAU is able to make changes along these lines, it
will be unable to ensure compliance with any other legal regime (e.g.,
international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law) aimed at
protecting the rights of refugees and internally displaced persons.
Consequently, displaced persons will not receive the protections to
which they are legally entitled, and the OAU’s ability to curb conflict
will remain minimal.  As a result, Member States will continue to
question its capacity to genuinely mitigate conflict or act as a conflict
broker.
C. Conflict Resolution
The OAU has demonstrated its willingness and ability to engage
in conflict resolution.  It has partaken in various post-conflict peace-
building activities including confidence-building measures, with
varying degrees of success in Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, and
Western Sahara, and the monitoring of elections in the Comoros, Li-
beria, and Sierra Leone.  Although the OAU’s budget is insufficient
compared to the needs of the African continent, it has been arguably
successful at mobilizing resources and calling attention to issues of in-
ternational concern.  For example, during the OAU Council of Minis-
80. Jakkie Cilliers, Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity: Mythical Construct or Essen-
tial Tool?, AFR. SECURITY REV., Vol. 8, No. 4, at 27 (1999).
81. P. Mweti Munya, The Organization of African Unity and Its Role in Regional Conflict
Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 591
(1999).
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ters Sixty-Sixth Ordinary Session in Harare, Zimbabwe, in May 1997,
the Council of Ministers decided to firmly condemn the overthrow of
the democratically elected government of President Ahmed Tijan
Kabbah of Sierra Leone and called “for the immediate restoration of
constitutional order [and appealed] to the leaders of ECOWAS to as-
sist the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order to the
country.”82  In like manner, the OAU appealed to the United Nations
and the whole of the international community not to recognize the
illegal junta in Sierra Leone.  In October of the same year, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1132, which placed a petroleum
and arms embargo on the country and imposed travel restrictions on
the military junta and their families.83  Moreover, the resolution per-
mitted ECOWAS to enforce its terms.84  OAU action in this respect
must not be ignored, as it signals significant political maturity, and
demonstrates its ability and commitment to utilize its resources and
leverage to curb international public opinion to safeguard democratic
institutions and forestall conflict.85  Its outspokenness in the case of
Sierra Leone represents a precedent and perhaps a shift in policy in
this regard.  Notwithstanding, the OAU’s history of inaction has lead
many analysts to argue that it has failed to put theory into practice on
issues concerning state’s responsibility, human rights, and the rule of
law,86 and as a result, has been generally ineffective in the area of con-
flict resolution.87  The fact remains that the OAU, like NATO and the
United Nations, is an organization made up of and directed by its
Member States, and not a supranational entity entrusted with powers
to police its members.  Ultimately, it will represent the interests of its
members and likewise be shaped by their mores, values, and charac-
teristics.  This may explain why, at times, the OAU’s policies appear
protective and conservative on the one hand, and transparent and lib-
eral on the other.  Such a dichotomy is the manifestation of the vari-
ous political characteristics of its leaders, ranging from autocratic,
militaristic, and neo-patrimonial, to democratic.  Until the OAU be-
82. Organisation of African Unity Council of Ministers Sixty-Sixth Ordinary Session, Ha-
rare, Zimbabwe, May 28-30, 1997, at 18, Draft Decisions CM/Draft/Dec. (LXVI) Rev. 1 (1997).
83. See S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 3822th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997).
84. See id.
85. However, international advocacy should only be seen as one of several tactical means
to resolve conflict.
86. See, e.g., Osita C. Eze, The Organisation of African Unity and Human Rights: Twenty-
Five Years After, 14 NIG. J. INT’L AFF. 163-64 (1988).  See also Joe Oloka-Onyango, The Place
and Role of the OAU Bureau for Refugees, 6 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 34, 39 (1994).
87. See generally P. Mweti Munya, supra note 81.
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comes consistent in the way that it adheres to domestic and interna-
tional laws and norms, refugees and IDPs and returnees in Africa will
not receive the protections for which they are legally and morally en-
titled.
IV.  SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT
MAINTENANCE: ECOWAS, SADC, AND IGAD
A. Conflict Prevention
The ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD have the same conflict pre-
ventive disabilities as the OAU because they too lack early warning
and risk assessment capacities.  The IGAD, and to some extent
ECOWAS, lack reconnaissance and logistical capacities, whereas
SADC has access to such capabilities and other military assets
through South Africa, and to some extent Zimbabwe.  Nevertheless,
there are no provisions in the SADC Organ for Politics, Defense and
Security (1995),88 the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense and Secu-
rity in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Re-
gion (1997),89 or the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (MCPMRPS)
(1998),90 that make specific reference to refugees and internally dis-
placed persons.  Conversely, in theory, the IGAD has demonstrated
its commitment to protecting the rights of displaced persons by
adopting the following: the IGAD Strategy Framework (1996);
IGAD Program on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management
(1998);91 Proposal for the Enhancement of IGAD’s Emergency Pre-
88. See The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ for Politics, De-
fence and Security, Gaborone, Botswana, June 28, 1996, compiled in AFRICA: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS ON POLITICAL, SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC ISSUES, INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA, at 32-35, Ad hoc Publicaton No 33 (Nov.
1996) [hereinafter SADC Organ]. Among other things, the Organ was established to maintain
peace and security and protect the people of Southern Africa from the brutal effects of conflict.
89. See Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Region, compiled in AFRICAN LEGAL MATERIALS, AFR. J. INT’L & COMP.
L., Mar. 1999, at 197 [hereinafter SADC Protocol]. The purpose of the Protocol is to give effect
to the objectives of the SADC Organ including provision for peace-keeping and peace-making
activities.
90. See ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-
Keeping and Security, Meeting of Ministers of Defense, Internal Affairs and Security, Banjul,
23-24 July 1998, adopted by the Meeting of Heads of State at Abuja 30-31 October 1998, com-
piled in AFRICAN LEGAL MATERIALS, AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L., Mar. 1999, at 148 [hereinafter
ECOWAS Mechanism]. I also refer to the above as the ECOWAS Mechanism and the
MCPMRPS.
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paredness and Response Capacity for Humanitarian Emergencies
within the IGAD Sub-Region (1999).
Nevertheless, it could be argued that other provisions in the
ECOWAS and SADC mechanisms, which emphasize human rights
and humanitarian law, are intended to “cover” or take into considera-
tion the plight of displaced populations.  Furthermore, Provisions
8(d) and 9 of the Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Ac-
tion which was adopted at the OAU First Ministerial Conference on
Human Rights in Africa emphasize the importance of population dis-
placement in Africa.92  This, however, does not alter the fact that the
ECOWAS and SADC charters, subsequent protocols, and other in-
struments do not make specific reference to refugees or internally
displaced persons.  In this regard, even though IGAD’s protective ca-
pacity is still in an embryonic stage, the specific references in its in-
struments to IDPs and refugees demonstrate its commitment to the
latter, and should serve as an example for the ECOWAS and SADC.
SADC has been the least effective African regional actor in the
areas of preventive diplomacy and deployment.  Its botched interven-
tion in Lesotho93 and its failed peace-making efforts in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) represent the only authentic
SADC attempts to forestall conflict.94  On the other hand,
ECOWAS’s diplomatic and military missions in Liberia, Sierra Le-
one, and Guinea-Bissau were arguably better.  In this respect, Ram-
charan comments that
ECOWAS must be credited with one of the first attempts in the
history of international peace-keeping at the use of peace-keeping
forces for preventive purposes, something that was later to earn the
United Nations credit with its preventive deployment in the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYOM).95
91. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Programme on Conflict Preven-
tion, Resolution and Management (1998) (visited Sept. 29, 1999) <http://www.igad.org/press10.
htm> [hereinafter IGAD]. The IGAD Program was introduced to build capacity, create an early
warning mechanism, share its post-conflict peace-building experiences, and co-ordinate efforts
to promote a culture of peace and tolerance. The IGAD does not envisage itself engaging in
operable conflict management.
92. See Declaration and Plan of Action, OAU First Ministerial Conference on Human
Rights in Africa, 12-16 Apr 1999, Grand Bay (Mauritius), OAU DOC. CONF/HRA/DECL (I)
(Apr 16, 1999).
93. See generally Jakkie Cilliers, supra note 80, at 28.
94. See generally Maxi van Aardt, The SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security:
Challenges for Regional Community Building, S. AFR. J. INT’L. AFF., Winter 1997, at 144 (for an
interesting analysis of some of the inherent institutional problems in the SADC Organ).
95. B.G. Ramcharan, Cooperation between the U.N. and Regional/Sub-Regional Organisa-
tions in Internal Conflicts: The Case of Liberia, 4 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 8-9 (1996).
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In the case of Liberia, however, it may be argued that ECOWAS
prolonged the Liberian Civil War (1989-1997) causing more harm
than good to displaced persons.96  Alternatively, its intervention in Si-
erra Leone saved thousands of lives by providing a buffer between
the combatants and hundreds of thousands of forcibly displaced per-
sons.  Still, ECOWAS has not succeeded in forestalling conflict by
purely diplomatic means (e.g., Guinea-Bissau), which may signal a
fault in its conflict prevention capacity or may be a result of the harsh
brand of conflicts with which it has been forced to contend.  Similarly,
although IGAD has been intimately involved in conflict mediation in
Somalia and Sudan,97 the “on again, off again” dynamics of those con-
flicts raise questions about IGAD’s conflict prevention capacity in the
area of preventive diplomacy.  In view of this, the ECOWAS, SADC,
and IGAD need to work diligently to strengthen their capabilities in
this area.
B. Conflict Management
As previously mentioned, conflict management is the most im-
portant conflict maintenance process with respect to the protection of
displaced persons.98  Lately, the OAU and IGAD have become more
concerned with developing and enhancing their conflict prevention
capabilities, as both of them are in the process of establishing conflict
early warning and risk assessment capabilities.  In the past, African
regional actors have engaged in peace-keeping to monitor cease-fires
(e.g., OAU in Rwanda and Burundi), and partaken in peace-
enforcement operations (e.g., SADC in Lesotho) and humanitarian
interventions (e.g., ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-
Bissau) in order to halt warfare, restore democracy, and establish se-
curity and stability in troubled states.
ECOWAS has far more experience protecting displaced persons
via peace-keeping and peace-enforcement than the OAU, SADC,
and IGAD combined.99  Its Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) has evolved from an ad hoc grouping of states into a
permanent humanitarian enforcement mechanism, the MCPMRPS.
96. Funmi Olonisakin & Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Humanitarian Intervention and Human
Rights: The Contradictions in ECOMOG, INT’L J. HUM. RTS., Spring 1999, at 22.
97. Knife Abraham, The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Organisations: Statement by the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 18 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 102, 106 (1999).
98. See infra Introduction.
99. Since IGAD does not have a genuine conflict management capacity (with exception to
intense preventive diplomacy) it will not be discussed in this section. See IGAD, supra note 91.
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The MCPMRPS may evolve to be the most comprehensive con-
flict management mechanism on the African continent.  The most sa-
lient features of the MCPMRPS concerning displaced persons are
found in Articles 17 and 18. Article 17 calls for the establishment of a
Mediation and Security Council (MSC), which in times of crisis will
be “empowered to take decisions on issues of regional peace and se-
curity on behalf of the Authority of Heads of State and Govern-
ment.”100  More specifically, however, Article 18 of the MCPMRPS
states that the MSC may “authorise all forms of interventions, in-
cluding the decision to deploy political and military missions.”101
Similarly, Article 46 states that in internal conflict situations that are
sustained and maintained from within, the Mediation and Security
Council may employ military missions when circumstances exist that
threaten to trigger humanitarian disaster,102 pose a serious threat to
peace and security in the sub-region,103 and erupt following the over-
throw or attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected govern-
ment.104  Under Article 45, the MCPMRPS “military instrument will
be a standby force, which shall be called ECOMOG.”105  Hence, from
the above provisions it is clear that under ECOWAS law, ECOMOG
may lawfully be dispatched in times of armed conflict to safeguard
displaced persons.
ECOWAS’s consolidation of political and operational control
into one body, the Mediation and Security Council, will undoubtedly
result in its rendering more timely assistance to refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons.  Likewise, the guiding criteria in Article 46
are tailored broadly enough to include preventive enforcement mis-
sions aimed at averting the conditions responsible for producing dis-
placed persons amidst, for example, low intensity armed conflict.
From a legal, political, and perhaps military perspective, when the
MCPMRPS is fully instituted it will have the most sophisticated con-
flict management capacity on the African continent.  If the present
capability of ECOWAS is measured by its recent operation in
Guinea-Bissau, however, its operational proficiency clearly must
evolve to complement the theoretical ambitions of the MCPMRPS.
Still, with the advent of democracy in West Africa’s only hegemony,
100. ECOWAS Mechanism, supra note 90, art. 17.
101. Id. art. 18.
102. See id. art. 46 (i).
103. See id. art. 46 (ii)
104. See id. art. 46(iii).
105. Id. art. 45.
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Nigeria, and the coming of the MCPMRPS, it is clear that ECOWAS
will strengthen its collective framework and improve its capability if
legitimacy, efficiency, and accountability are key indicators of its fu-
ture development.106
The SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (Organ) is
the foremost conflict management mechanism in Southern Africa.
Similar to ECOWAS’s MCPMRPS, it does not explicitly make refer-
ence to refugees and internally displaced persons; however, a cursory
glance at the objectives of the Organ shows that its framers had the
latter in mind.  For example, one of the principal goals of the Organ is
“to protect the people [of Southern Africa] and safeguard the devel-
opment of the region, against instability arising from the breakdown
of law and order, intrastate conflict and external aggression.”107
Similarly, it seeks to encourage the observance of universal human
rights as enumerated in the Charters and Conventions of the OAU
and the United Nations.108  In circumstances where diplomacy cannot
avert armed conflict, Provision (g) of the Organ provides for the
adoption of a Protocol on Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution, to
guide the organ in this respect.109  The Protocol was adopted by the
SADC in June 1995.  Similar to the Organ, however, the Protocol also
fails to make reference to and provide specific protections to forcibly
displaced persons.  Nonetheless, it empowers the Organ to employ
peace-keeping forces in order to achieve sustainable peace and secu-
rity.110  Moreover, akin to the MCPMRPS, the Protocol offers broad
criteria upon which regional intervention could be taken in internal
conflict situations, namely the following: large-scale violence between
sections of the population of a State, or between the State and/or its
armed or para-military forces and sections of the population;111 a
threat to the legitimate authority of the government (such as a mili-
tary coup by armed or para-military forces);112 a condition of civil war
or insurgency;113 and any crisis that could threaten the peace and secu-
106. Funmi Olonisakin & Jeremy Levitt, Regional Security and the Challenges of Democra-
tization in Africa: TheCase of ECOWAS and SADC, CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L. AFF.,
Autumn/Winter 1999, at 73.
107. SADC Organ, supra note 88, provision (a).
108. See id. provision (h).
109. See id. provision (g).
110. See SADC Protocol, supra note 89, art. 2(I).
111. Id. arts. 5(2)(1)(a-d).
112. Id. art. 5(2)(1)(b).
113. Id. art. 5(2)(1)(c).
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rity of other Member States.114  Furthermore, it states that in internal
conflict situations the “Organ shall respond to an invitation by a
member country to become involved in mediating a conflict within its
borders.”115
Nevertheless, there is an overarching non-interventionist tone to
the Protocol, which may be a result of geopolitical tensions and ri-
valry between Zimbabwe and South Africa, as neither country sub-
scribes to the idea of extending the other authority to invade its terri-
tory during times of conflict.  Whatever the case may be, under the
terms of the Protocol, SADC may not take enforcement action to
avert conflict or likewise prevent coerced population movements and
safeguard displaced populations without the consent of the govern-
ment of the state in crisis.  As alluded to earlier, this type of policy
would appear to be counter-productive when the state is the referent
object of oppression.  In this sense, SADC’s institutional commitment
to prevent forced population movements and protect displaced
populations is questionable, and certainly lags behind the
ECOWAS’s, in part due to the Protocol’s state-centric focus.  Addi-
tionally, given the problems that South Africa had maintaining peace
and order in Lesotho, it would also appear to be less efficient than
ECOWAS at launching peace-keeping operations.116  Nevertheless,
with South Africa at the helm, SADC currently possesses the greatest
functional and operational peace-keeping and peace-enforcement ca-
pacity in Africa.
C. Conflict Resolution
The OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD have engaged in con-
flict resolution with varying degrees of success.  The OAU and
ECOWAS would appear to be the most active in this respect.  How-
ever, again, due to the technological and military assets at its disposal,
SADC would appear to have the greatest capability to engage in
long-term conflict resolution.  Yet, if its leaders can learn from the
mistakes of the OAU, ECOWAS, and SADC, IGAD will be in a po-
sition to become an effective conflict resolution broker.  Notwith-
standing, all four suffer from limited resources, a difficulty which has
heavily impacted their ability to fruitfully engage in this area.
114. Id. art. 5(2)(1)(d).
115. Id. art. 5(2)(2).
116. See generally Willie Breytenbach, Failure of Security Co-operation in SADC: The Sus-
pension of the Organ for Politics, Defense and Security, S. AFR. J. INT’L. AFF., Summer 2000, at
91-95.
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Again, the ECOWAS has been the most operative regional actor
in conflict resolution.  In contrast, SADC has only had to deal with
the crisis in Lesotho in 1998.  Recent developments in the DRC, how-
ever, are bound to test its conflict resolution capabilities. Similarly,
IGAD’s conflict resolution capacity is untested, as it has focused the
majority of its attention on conflict prevention, through preventive
diplomacy and the institution of a Conflict Early Warning and Early
Response Mechanism.  Still, it has engaged in laudable mediation ef-
forts in the ongoing conflicts in Somalia and the Sudan.117
The ECOWAS has engaged in post conflict peace-building ac-
tivities in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau.  In all three
situations it conducted security, demobilization, reintegration, repa-
triation, election monitoring functions, and confidence-building
measures and post-conflict reconstruction and development activities.
Although warfare has come to an end in Liberia and Sierra Leone
and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons have begun to repa-
triate and return to their places of habitual residence, the ECOWAS
has not yet established structures that bring about genuine justice and
reconciliation.  Similar to the OAU, SADC, and IGAD, ECOWAS
has been preoccupied with creating the necessary conditions for de-
mocratization through free and fair elections rather than dealing with
the societal manifestations of warfare.  In this context, it has adopted
a Western approach to peace-making and fallen victim to the contra-
dictions of liberal democracy, as evidenced by its support for the 7
July 1999 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Le-
one and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone.118  The
agreement essentially empowers war criminals to rule over war vic-
tims by giving them de jure authority, i.e., key cabinet positions in
government.  It subverts the domestic populations’ right to self-
determination and abridges their domestic and international right to
bring claims against combatants for war crimes and crimes against
humanity by granting the former general amnesty.119  Throughout
West Africa and the Continent, no judicial mechanisms exist for ci-
vilians to bring such claims, and it does not appear that ECOWAS
plans to introduce one any timein the near future.  Conflict resolution
117. See IGAD Programme on Conflict, Prevention, Resolution, and Management, Back-
ground Section (1999) <http://www.igad.org/press10.htm>.
118. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolution-
ary United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777, 1999.
119. See id.  However, the amnesty is domestic in nature and will not protect them from be-
ing prosecuted under international law for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
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of this nature is by design cosmetic, and to the extent that history can
shed light on future events, conflict will inevitably resume in Sierra
Leone, as warlords have no interest in or respect for the rule of law.
ECOWAS, however, is not unique is this regard since the OAU,
SADC, and IGAD have yet to institute judicial mechanisms which
empower war victims to bring claims against combatants for war
crimes.  Accordingly, there is no African mechanism that permits in-
dividual refugees to bring claims against host state governments or
combatants for violating their human rights.  Until such structures are
instituted, the international community should question the authen-
ticity of African governments and regional actors to tackle problems
associated with the plight of displaced persons.
V.  ENHANCING AFRICA’S PROTECTIVE AND
PREVENTIVE CAPACITIES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
THE WAY FORWARD
A. Preventing Conflict and Promoting Trust
There is no simple remedy for conflict once it manifests.  Every
conflict is unique.  Political will and resources aside, peace ultimately
depends on whether or not the parties in conflict want it.  In the final
analysis, peace must be internally driven.  Once internal governance
and preventive structures break down, conflict prevention ultimately
depends on the willingness of opposing parties to accept external
diplomatic intervention.  Absent such commitment, warfare and its
offspring, coerced population movements, may be unavoidable.  As
early intervention is the easiest way to avert conflict, African states
and regional actors must be resolute in their commitment to institute
the necessary mechanisms to engage in fruitful conflict prevention.
As the discussion above highlights, they appear to be making some
progress in this area, although their ability to reliably forecast conflict
and proffer rapid diplomatic responses is weak.  As a result, they
must commit more resources to building conflict early warning, risk
assessment, and rapid diplomatic deployment capabilities.
The UNHCR is in a strong position to qualitatively assist African
regional actors in enhancing their protective capacities.  Although it
currently spends over forty percent of its resources in Africa,120 it
120. See Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Promoting Peace
and Security: Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees in Africa, Briefing at the Formal Session of
the Security Council (July 26, 1999).
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needs to play “a more visible advocacy role in order to convince state
actors to adhere to refugee protection principles, by building princi-
ples and guidelines into the sub-regional institutional framework, and
providing material and technical support to refugee related institu-
tional mechanism.”121  In this regard, it should enter into and update
on a biannual basis humanitarian based memorandums of under-
standing with African regional organizations, which clearly delineate
their commitment to safeguarding the rights of refugees and IDPs.
The Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) that the UNHCR con-
cluded with SADC in July 1996 and IGAD in November 1997 are
seminal examples in this regard.122  These MOUs, however, are weak
in that they do not include provisions that state the organization’s
commitment to adhere to the international protection regime (i.e., in-
ternational human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law). Rule of law
issues need to be featured prominently in future agreements.  Pursu-
ant to their respective articles on supplementary arrangements,123 the
SADC and IGAD Memorandums should be amended accordingly.
Moreover, the UNHCR should seek to replicate and institute its
Country Information Project (COIP) and International Refugee
Electronic Network (IRENE), whose purpose is to gather and share
information regarding conditions in potential refugee-producing
states, in the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD. 124  At the very
least, the UNHCR could work with the OAU to establish such a ca-
pacity within the MCPMR and to support the creation of a continent-
wide information sharing system with satellite offices in each of the
sub-regional organizations.  This suggestion comports with the rec-
ommendation adopted at the OAU/UNHCR meeting in Khartoum,
Sudan, in December 1998, which concluded that the OAU should
strengthen its early warning system with the assistance of the United
Nations to enable it to better monitor humanitarian developments
121. UNHCR Policy Framework for Africa 2000-2001, UNHCR Africa Bureau (2000).
122. Memorandum of Understanding between The Southern African Development Com-
munity and The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Gaborone, Botswana, July
25, 1996; Memorandum of Understanding between the Intergovernmental Authority for Devel-
opment and the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, Djibouti, Djibouti, June 19, 1997.
123. These agreements allow the organizations to enter into supplementary arrangements
within the scope of the Memorandums by amending them by mutual agreement between the
Contracting Parties.
124. See generally Hiram A. Ruiz, Emergencies: International Response to Refugee Flows
and Complex Emergencies, INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 148, 157 (July 1995) (Special Issue: Organisa-
tion of African Unity/United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Addis Ababa Sympo-
sium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in African 8-10 September 1995).
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and crises and inform its member states.125  Such a system would also
increase the UNHCR’s preventive capacity by allowing it to attain,
transfer and exchange information throughout the continent.
Although it might attempt too ambitious a goal, the UNHCR
could assist in the creation of Humanitarian Reaction Units in the
OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD, similar to its Emergency Pre-
paredness and Response Section (EPRS), which consists of fewer
than ten EPRS officers.126  The EPRS has a number of tools at its dis-
posal.127  The overall purpose of these officers is to “monitor regional
developments, establish contingency plans, develop operational pro-
cedures for emergencies, identify training needs for personnel as-
signed to work on emergencies, and, most importantly, [they] are de-
ployed to the field to lead needs-assessment missions and emergency
response teams as necessary.”128  As indicated earlier, preventive de-
ployment of this nature is important in that it demonstrates the inter-
venors’ commitment to build trust and resolve crisis by peaceful
means.  It also allows for the gathering of vital information and data
on the conditions and needs of displaced populations.  The UNHCR
could also enter into operable memorandums of understanding with
African regional actors, which would allow personnel deployment for
standby EPRS operations and in addition serve as liaisons between
the UNHCR and their respective organizations.  These actors could
also seek to embark on joint missions with the EPRS or other U.N.
personnel in order to establish a nexus between national, regional,
and international efforts to prevent or minimize the effects of conflict
on civilian populaces.
Taken together, early warning/risk assessment and preventive
diplomacy/deployment are the most viable ways to forestall and
minimize conflict.  Early warning and risk assessment processes do
not prevent coerced population movements, but rather inform opera-
tional processes aimed at this objective.  In like manner, preventive
deployment (emergency preparedness) is not practicable, wanting
sound and reliable information and resources.  In order to prevent
conflict effectively, mechanisms that consolidate all four processes
must be instituted. Most importantly, however, issues related to re-
125. Khartoum Recommendations of the OAU Ministerial Meeting on Refugees, Returnees
and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, Khartoum, Sudan, Dec. 13-14, 1998, (on file with
Duke Journal. of Comparative & International Law).
126. See Ruiz, supra note 124, at 157.
127. See id. at 155.
128. See id.
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sources and operational logistics are moot, unless African leaders
garner the political will to take action.
B. Managing Conflict and Establishing Order
The role of regional actors in conflict management is to provide a
remedy for the failure of the domestic system to protect civilians in
times of armed conflict.  In this context, as previously stated, the most
challenging task for African regional actors is the physical and legal
protection of displaced persons and the prevention of refugee flows.
The OAU, ECOWAS, IGAD, and to a lesser extent SADC, how-
ever, are hindered by a lack of resources, reconnaissance and logistics
capabilities, command and control organization, and technical legal
support.  Until recently, the UNHCR, UNDP, and the donor com-
munity were not aggressive in seeking ways to assist African regional
organizations to strengthen their protective capacities.  Even the High
Commissioner for Refugees has remarked that there is “a perception
disparity in the assistance given, to displaced persons from Kosovo, as
opposed to that given to African.”129  This reality, coupled with in-
creasing donor fatigue, has meant that displaced persons have not re-
ceived the requisite amount of protection to which they are legally
entitled.  It is therefore evident that domestic and international poli-
tics have taken precedence over the rule of law, that is, states’ obliga-
tions to render timely and adequate assistance to African refugees
and IDPs.  Hence, the tragic events in Liberia, Rwanda, and Burundi
in the early 1990s, and Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, DRC, and Niger
in the late 1990s, demonstrate that the international community has
failed to fulfill its erga omnes obligation to safeguard the rights of dis-
placed persons and other war-affected populations in Africa.
Therefore, Africans should, in partnership with external actors,
take the leadership role in the management of African conflicts. In
order for the OAU to minimize the effects of war on civilian popula-
tions, it must work with states toward restructuring Africa’s collective
security framework.  Existing structures must be revamped in order
to maximize the capabilities of African states.  This may entail sub-
regional organizations entering into bilateral agreements with donor
states to assist them in strengthening their peace-making capabili-
ties.130  In this context, the OAU should establish an autonomous
129. Ogata, supra note 120.
130. The United States’ African Crisis Response Initiative is one example in this respect.
See generally Jeremy Levitt, The African Crisis Response Initiative: A General Survey, 28 AFR.
INSIGHT 3/4, at 100 (1998).
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OAU Organ on Peace and Security (the “Organ”), which would as-
sume absolute political and legal oversight and jurisdiction over all
enforcement operations in and outside of Africa.  From this view, the
relevant sub-regional actor whose Member State is a target for inter-
vention would be primarily, but not entirely, responsible for con-
ducting and leading all operations. 131  Command and control respon-
sibilities, however, would be shared between the Organ and sub-
regional actor.  Under this scheme, the Organ would be able to by-
pass the OAU’s bureaucracy and take decisive action when needed.
Likewise, there would be no need for the OAU to develop a peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement capacity, as sub-regional actors
would be responsible for mounting all operations.  On this point, sev-
eral delegations at the OAU/UNHCR Regional Meeting on Refugee
Issues in the Great Lakes in Kampala, Uganda, in May 1998 “ob-
served that regional multinational forces might prove more effective
than international forces as a means of maintaining peace and secu-
rity in areas of conflict.”132  Furthermore, Recommendation Twelve of
the Addis Ababa Document supports this contention by calling for an
“effective response to the refugee problem on a regional basis” and,
stating that “where emergencies are beyond humanitarian action
alone, the necessary political initiatives may also require a regional
approach.”133  A collective security framework of this type would pro-
vide for greater accountability and legitimacy in and outside of Af-
rica.  It would also prevent sub-regional actors from being unduly in-
fluenced by the foreign policy objectives of regional hegemonies (e.g.,
Nigeria/ECOWAS and South Africa/SADC) because African states
from throughout the continent would (via the Organ) take part in de-
cisions to employ force.
African regional actors also need to develop an African-based
humanitarian enforcement doctrine, including operational guidelines
for robust peace-keeping, i.e. peace-enforcement, that may necessi-
tate defensive military elements, which would take into consideration
the geopolitics of the Continent and the dynamics of African conflict.
131. In certain instances, regional collective humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts
appears to be supported under customary international law. See also Jeremy Levitt, Humani-
tarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia
and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 2, 1998.
132. OAU/UNHCR Secretariat Report, Regional Meeting on Refugee Issues in the Great
Lakes, Kampala, Uganda,  May 8-9, 1998.
133. The Addis Ababa Document on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in
Africa, Recommendation Twelve, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Sept. 8-10, 1994.  Adopted by the
OAU/UNHCR Symposium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa.
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Furthermore, the UNHCR, ICRC, U.N. Department of Peace-
keeping Operations (DPKO) and the U.N. Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), should work with African re-
gional organizations to create a code of conduct for forces participat-
ing in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations.134  The
DPKO should consult with African military experts to replicate and
modify its newly devised code of conduct (instituted in 1997) to ac-
count for the dynamics of African conflict, so that African military
commanders have incentive to use it as a training tool.135  Similarly,
African leaders should work with the DPKO and the UNHCR to
codify protection principles in their respective conflict management
and early warning mechanisms (e.g., the ECOWAS MCPMRPS and
SADC Organ).  IGAD should give due consideration to this issue as
it develops its conflict early warning and early response mechanism.
Because the presence of armed elements among civilian refugee
populations is currently a serious problem, an African humanitarian
enforcement doctrine could also be used to guide and empower Afri-
can regional actors to safeguard the welfare of displaced persons in
flight and protect them from infiltration when encamped.  The expe-
riences (lessons learned and best practices) of African regional actors
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic,
Lesotho, and currently the DRC should be documented and utilized
for the creation of such a doctrine.  Consequently, the UNHCR,
UNHCHR, and UNDP should work with African regional actors and
refugee hosting states to develop the aforementioned doctrine and as-
sist them in developing comprehensive pre-entry encampment
screening systems.  In order to “preserve the civilian and humanitar-
ian character of refugee camps and settlements,”136 states in conso-
nance with the OAU, sub-regional actors, and UNHCR must “take
necessary measures by separating armed elements’ from civilian
populations,”137 and disarm the latter before they enter into countries
of asylum.
134. This view is shared by Bianfer Nowrojee, UN and African Regional Responsibility to
Provide Human Rights Protection to the Internally Displaced: Learning Lesson from the Experi-
ence of UNDP in Kenya, 18 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 1, 55-56 (1999).
135. The U.N. Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets is listed in UN CHRONICLE, No. 3, 1997,
at 40-41.
136. UNHCR Report, OAU Experts and Ministerial Meetings on Refugees, Returnees and
Displaced Persons in Africa, Dec. 10-14, 1998, Khartoum Sudan, Recommendations, Provision
9, Annex 3 BR/COM/Rec.I (I) (on file with Duke Journal of Comparative & International
Law).
137. Id.
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The UNHCR, UNHCHR, ICRC, and UNDP should also work
together to establish and sponsor the promotion of human rights law,
humanitarian law, and refugee law programs for African policy mak-
ers and lawyers, especially those on active duty in regional organiza-
tions. They should also render support in the areas of “emergency
management and provision of humanitarian assistance.”138  The OAU,
ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD have very small legal affairs divisions
and the majority of their legal staff are not formally trained in public
international law.  Public international lawyers are needed to inform
decision-making processes especially on issues related to humanitar-
ian, human rights, and refugee law and the law of the use of force.
Knowledge of and adherence to the rule of law is crucial for the sanc-
tity of humanitarian missions and hence the safety and protection of
displaced persons and peace-enforcers alike.
C. Resolving Conflict and Maintaining Peace and Stability
In general, African regional actors have poor conflict resolution
capacities, and displaced persons and other civilian victims of war are
without judicial remedies.  Often the rights of civilian populations are
dually violated by inadequate or non-existent national, regional, and
international judicial systems.  As one analyst notes, “African troops
sent to restore peace have been in many cases responsible for human
rights violations themselves, including killings, torture, rape and arms
trading with rebel groups.”139  In response, the “OAU has failed to put
in place adequate protections to guard against such abuses.”140  Al-
though individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are
entitled to file human rights claims with the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Commission), it essentially has no
power to act unilaterally or the authority to bind states to its deci-
sions.141  All of the Commission’s findings and recommendations must
be forwarded to the Authority of Heads of State and Government
(AHSG) for consideration.142  This means that the “decisions of the
Commission are subject to the approval of the OAU, a political
138. Id. at Provision 25.
139. Nowrojee, supra note 134, at 58.
140. Id.
141. See The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted on  June 27, 1981, in
Nairobi, Kenya, by the OAU.  It entered into force on October 21, 1986. OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5,  21 I.L.M. 58.  The African Commission was founded in 1987 to promote
and protect human rights in Africa.  It was established under Article 30 of the African Charter.
142. See The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 141, at art. 58-59.
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body.”143  As a result, the Commission is defunct because its political
and judicial authority is contingent on the approval of the political
elite.  Likewise, the Protocols establishing the ECOWAS Community
Court of Justice (1991)144 and the OAU African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (1998)145 have not been fully ratified. Notwithstanding
the absence of approval from the state concerned, the OAU Court
lacks the jurisdictional authority to adjudicate claims from individuals
and NGOs,146 whereas the ECOWAS Court has no competency to
adjudicate individual claims, but only those brought by states.147  Thus,
similar to the Commission, its jurisdictional mandate is subject to the
approval of politicians who may be the very source of oppression.
Hence, African war victims have no judicial recourse and are subject
to the reconciliatory mandates of their rulers.
This trend may change with the coming of the International
Criminal Court, which was established in Rome on July 18, 1998.148
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to heinous crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole, including genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.149  How-
ever, the court does not have original jurisdiction and will only act af-
ter a national legal system either has failed to carry out its obligation
to investigate and prosecute or is otherwise unwilling to do so.150
Nevertheless, African leaders should work to insure that regional ju-
dicial mechanisms are in place and accessible to complainants.  If Af-
rican governments fail to establish and empower structures to meet
these objectives they will inadvertently be subjecting themselves to
international, as opposed to regional, judicial intervention in their in-
ternal affairs.  In this context, the UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNDP,
143. Evelyn A. Ankuma, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 24 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996).
144. See art. 18, ECOWAS, 14th Sess., Protocol A/P.1/7/91 (1991), 30 I.L.M. 1241 (1991).
145. Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.1 rev.2 (1997).
146. See id. art. 6(5).
147. See ECOWAS Protocol, supra note 144, at art. 9 (1-3).
148. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Adopted by the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).  At the time of this writ-
ing, there are ninety-five signatories to the Treaty of Establishing the International Criminal
Court.  It has received seven out of sixty ratification’s necessary for it to enter into force.  See
also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International Criminal Court in Historical Perspective, 1999 ST.
LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 55 (2000).
149. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 148, at art. 5.
150. See id. art. 17(1)(a).
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ICRC and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) should work
with them to establish and strengthen their national and regional ju-
dicial capacities and simultaneously seek to bring justice to those re-
sponsible for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.151
That said, it must not be forgotten that intergovernmental organiza-
tions like the UNHCR “cannot end humanitarian violations or inter-
nal conflicts, nor can [they] rebuild shattered legal systems or prose-
cute war criminals” as these issues “demand regionally-focused and
internationally-supported responses.”152
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has commented that combat-
ants should be held criminally and “financially liable for their victims
under international law where civilians are made the deliberate target
of aggression, and that international legal machinery be developed to
facilitate efforts to find, attach and seize the assets of transgressing
parties and their leaders.”153  Moreover, he urges states to prosecute
persons under their authority for “grave breaches of international
humanitarian law on the basis of the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion,”154 which from the Author’s perspective would seem most practi-
cable under the aegis of sub-regional and regional organizations.  Du-
rable peace, reconciliation, and respect for the rule of law would seem
to lie on the principle of international accountability for war crimes
and crimes against humanity, in which the UNHCR should have a
keen interest given the potential impact on large-scale voluntary re-
patriation and the safe return of displaced persons.  At the very least,
the UNHCR should work with community-based organizations and
associations to establish grass roots reconciliatory mechanisms in war-
torn societies and institute community education programs on basic
refugee law principles in refugee hosting communities.
The OAU, ECOWAS, IGAD, and to a lesser extent the SADC,
lack the institutional capabilities to perform important post-war func-
tions.  For example, none of them have stand-alone demining pro-
151. For a excellent article that examines the pros and cons of the prosecutorial processes of
national courts and ad hoc international tribunals to deal with war crimes and cremes against
humanity, see Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The International
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.56
(1999).
152. United Nations General Assembly Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s
Programme, 47th Sess., Note on International Protection, Provision 16, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/863
(1996).
153. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/1999/957 (1999).
154. Id.
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grams or post-conflict rehabilitation and re-integration mechanisms.
Instead, they rely on the United Nations, donor states and other non-
governmental actors to provide such services.  They also lack the
technical sophistication to conduct large-scale demobilization and
disarmament operations.  Therefore, the organizations should work
with the U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDA) and
U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to develop such
a capacity.  Failure to demobilize and disarm combatants can lead to
unfettered warfare (e.g., Sierra Leone in the post Lome Peace
Agreement environment) and have serious human rights implications
for refugees and IDPs.  Therefore, the effect of the OAU Refugee
Convention could be enhanced and complemented with a code of
conduct for non-state actor belligerents, which would highlight prin-
ciples enshrined in the Convention and relevant humanitarian law in-
struments like the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their subse-
quent protocols.  This suggestion comports with the Addis Ababa
Document Recommendation Four, which urged “all parties in armed
conflict to respect the principles and norms of humanitarian law.”155
African regional organizations must also become resolute in pro-
viding humanitarian safe passage for refugees and IDPs seeking to re-
turn to their countries and places of habitual residence.  The concept
of voluntary repatriation requires that the necessary conditions for
repatriation be in place, namely, a cessation of conflict and a secure
and stable environment.  Similarly, in times of peace it may take sev-
eral years for refugees to repatriate, if at all, and therefore it is impor-
tant that they continue to receive all of the protections to which they
are legally entitled, including physical, material, legal, and psycho-
social security.156  Equally important, however, is the “establishment
of education and vocational training programs in refugee camps; and
the introduction of campaigns to ensure that refugees have a proper
knowledge of their rights and obligations under national, regional and
international law.”157  In this regard, the ICRC, ICJ, UNHCR, UNDP,
and the U. N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) could work together to es-
155. The Addis Ababa Document on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in
Africa, Recommendation Four, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (8-10 September 1994). Adopted by the
OAU/UNHCR Symposium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa.
156. See Jeff Crisp, Refugees in Africa: patterns, problems and policy issues, Paper prepared
for Dimensions of Vulnerability, a conference organized by Coventry University African Studies
Center and African Studies Association of the United Kingdom, Coventry University, 16 Sept.
1999 (on file with Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
157. OAU/UNHCR Regional Meeting on Refugee Issues in the Great Lakes, supra note
132.
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tablish Refugee Awareness Programs (RAP) that would empower
refugees to be vigilant and productive in their places of asylum.
In closing, African regional actors in partnership with the
UNHCR, UNHCHR, and UNDP need to develop post-war refugee
tracking and monitoring capabilities to insure that refugees are being
cared for properly.  They should therefore dispatch on a systematic
but ad hoc basis post-conflict maintenance observation units to moni-
tor the conditions of displaced persons and other civilians in post-war
states.
VI.  CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the regime for the international protection
of refugees, IDPs, and other persons of concern has come under un-
precedented pressure, and “much needs to be done, on a global scale,
to revitalize refugee protection.”158  Displaced persons in Africa are
an endangered class. Whilst human rights and humanitarian and refu-
gee protective norms provide some protections for persons during
armed conflict, “international humanitarian law is not a fertile source
of norms for the protection of persons fleeing armed conflict who
seek protection outside their country of origin.”159  Equally troubling
is the fact that African regional organizations appear to lack the ca-
pability to institute comprehensive conflict maintenance systems, and
that a large cross section of the international community has turned
their back on the dilemma of displaced populations in Africa.  As a
result refugees and IDPs in Africa suffer in three major ways.  First,
they lack sufficient international legal protections (this is especially
true IDPs).  Second, African states and regional actors have yet to
raise and put forth the necessary resources to thoroughly establish
conflict maintenance systems. As a result, there are no viable regional
mechanisms to protect displaced persons and prevent the influx of
refugee flows in states.  Finally, the international community has
failed to proffer adequate resources to safeguard the rights and well-
being of displaced populations in Africa, in many instances resulting
in suffering on a grand scale and death to the members of those
populations.
158. United Nations General Assembly Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s
Programme, 50th Sess., Note on International Protection, Provision 62, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/914
(1999).
159. Karoline Kerber, International humanitarian Law as a Source of Protection for Refu-
gees from Areas of Armed Conflict, 16 REFUGE: CANADA’S PERIODICAL ON REFUGEES  6, 7
(1997).
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Conflict early warning/risk assessment, preventive diplo-
macy/deployment, peace-keeping/peace-enforcement and post con-
flict peace building are unequivocal imperatives that African states
and regional actors must be able to engage in order to satisfactorily
safeguard the rights of displaced persons. The UNHCR should work
with African regional actors to develop mechanisms that reliably
forecast conflict—perhaps sub-regionally or through the OAU’s
MCPMR.  The UNHCR’s EPRS should also seek to embark on joint
missions with African regional organizations to enhance inter-
organizational cooperation in ascertaining crisis situations.  African
regional organizations should also consider developing a permanent
African security mechanism along the lines of the aforementioned
OAU Organ on Peace and Security to coordinate the regional secu-
rity needs of the continent.  In this context, sub-regional actors like
the ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD should take the leadership role in
their respective regions in all major humanitarian operations, espe-
cially those that entail the use of force.  Nevertheless, the latter
should work with the former to develop systems that identify and
separate combatants from civilians during asylum application proc-
esses and disarm and demobilize them in order to provide for a secure
and stable environment ripe for re-integration.
The international community, including the United Nations,
must cease engaging in international political cronyism, by placing the
needs of other nations above those of the African continent.  With
few exceptions, the post Cold War historical record reveals that
Western nations are unwilling to expend vast resources to save Afri-
can lives (e.g., those in Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone)
where there are no overwhelming strategic interests (like the U.S. in-
terests in Haiti or Western interests in Kosovo). Thus, Africans must
move beyond sexy clichés and genuinely take it upon themselves to
proffer African solutions for African problems, because the events of
the last decade shows that the rest of the world is not proactively con-
cerned. Hence, it is vital that the OAU aggressively seeks to build
meaningful partnerships with the various sub-regional organizations
and continue to mobilize resources, and harmonize and harness the
conflict maintenance capabilities of the Continent.
